Michael de Laine

Radicalisation’s causes are diverse and abundant, DIIS study shows

By Michael de Laine, Copenhagen, 13 March 2009

There is no single explanation for radicalisation – its causes are as diverse as they are abundant, said the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) in a recent report, ‘Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy’. The causes for radicalisation that can be found in the direct environment of the individual deserve further notice when shaping EU policies.

Independent factors are insufficient to result in radicalisation and radicalisation can only be the outcome of a complex interaction between factors, DIIS added in the report, which seeks to present an alternative to the so-called phase-model, which divides processes of radicalisation into distinct phases that all radicals are supposed to go through.

In its report, the institute presents an individually-focused approach that seeks to capture the multifaceted and highly personal development believed to be more true to the very different ways into radicalism.

According to DIIS, the first general assumptions on the phenomenon of radicalisation leading to modern-day terrorism date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Radicalisation among European Muslims has been the subject of study since the 1990s. Attention to this particular phenomenon has increased dramatically after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

Interest in radicalisation among Muslims in Europe and the phenomenon of home-grown Islamist terrorism received a boost by the Madrid bombings in 2004 and other incidents and arrests in, among others, the UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Denmark.

“However, the urge to understand and tackle the threat of radicalisation is not only rooted in fear of possible terrorist attacks,” DIIS said in the report. “Radicalisation of minority groups poses a serious threat to society and intercultural relations, even when, as in most cases, it does not lead to terrorism.”

The development of extreme attitudes and behaviours in minority groups can enhance impermeability of group boundaries and exert strong influence on groups’ social position in society, resulting in polarisation and intercultural tensions, the institute added.

DIIS noted that radicalisation is seen as a collective phenomenon – a process of socialisation – which is the result of individual behaviour. Also referred to as methodological individualism, it implies that radicalisation of collective entities can only be explained if we understand how individual behaviour emerges.

“There is no single explanation for radicalisation,” DIIS said. “The causes of radicalisation are as diverse as they are abundant. This implies that independent factors are insufficient to result in radicalisation and that radicalisation can only be the outcome of a complex interaction between factors.”

It said causal factors differ in the extent to which they contribute to radicalisation. The institute sees external factors like political, economic and cultural conditions shaping and constraining the individual’s environment but they do not have a direct effect on individual behaviour. At the social and individual level, dynamics in which the individual is directly involved need to be started in order for external factors to lead to radicalisation.

“Causal factors are further distinguished into causes that set the foundation for radicalisation, and catalysts that abruptly accelerate the radicalisation process,” DIIS added. “Based on the literature on radicalisation, these causes and catalysts can be additionally subdivided into a number of more specific types that are explained and analysed in the coming paragraphs.”

DIIS based its study on the main premise that, in general, radicals are ‘ordinary’ people: they are not insane psychopaths suffering from mental illnesses.

The institute concluded that radicalisation is a complex phenomenon with similarly complex causes.

“In order to understand what makes (often young and sometimes well-integrated) Muslims in Europe radicalise, we need to acknowledge that none of the causal factors discussed in the report suffices on their own in explaining radicalisation,” DIIS said in the report. “Rather, what we are facing is that individuals involved in violent radicalisation leading to terrorism come from a range of different social, cultural, religious, educational and professional backgrounds and enter into individual paths of radicalisation according to their specific background and personal history, who they meet at what point in time, how they interact with the group of people they most often radicalise with, etc.”

Furthermore, each individual is motivated by their specific combination of reasons for entering violent radicalisation and what triggers and catalysts they have been exposed to, the institute said.

DIIS studied five cases. Allowing for the fact that analysing only five cases does not bode for general conclusions, the institute noted a set of similarities among the case studies – similarities that were underpinned by the theoretical findings.

The case studies indicated that in none of the cases did any causal factor ‘dominated’ the radicalisation process, DIIS said.

“Rather, a specific combination of factors appeared to have been crucial determinants of the readiness for radicalisation,” it added. “In addition to causes like political factors, network dynamics and social identification issues, each individual experienced trigger events that could have accelerated the process. Whether it included the death of a relative, imprisonment or confrontation with provocative footage or literature, the lethal mixture of causal factors was diverse and unique for each individual.”

DIIS suggested that radicalisation is an individual condition that is predominantly caused by a combination of social and individual causal factors. In other words, dynamics in which the individual is directly involved cause radicalisation, which implies that in addition to personal characteristics, the individual’s (perceived) position in relation to relevant others affect his or her behaviour.

DIIS said it also concluded that much of the debate on radicalisation has focused too strongly on finding the causes of radicalisation in externalities like political and economic conditions.

“Indeed, external factors like Middle Eastern conflicts and poor integration of Muslim communities in Europe appear to serve as significant inspirations for many radicalised Muslims,” the institute said. “However, the radicalising effects of external factors should not be overestimated. Only in a complex, cross-level and cross-dimensional interaction can causal factors lead to radicalisation.”

External factors also shape and constrain the individual’s environment but do not have a direct effect on his or her behaviour.

“The complexity and uniqueness of causal factors of radicalisation signal that it is hard to define social groups that are vulnerable to radicalisation,” DIIS said. “The proportion of potentially radical individuals is so small and diverse that it is hard if not impossible to categorise them into groups with specified social boundaries.”

Furthermore, the institute said, research with the intention of profiling specific ‘ideal types’ of individuals, who are more susceptible to enter into violent radicalisation, seems futile.

DIIS identified a number of common traits and patterns for people who get involved in violent radicalisation – traits and patterns that open up the possibility of identifying counter-measures.

1. Processes of radicalisation are social processes which are inherently individual in nature and depend on the specific background, situation and personal characteristics of the person involved.

2. Social identification with allegedly harmed groups is an important indicator of vulnerability to radicalisation. In particular for people for whom group membership of the relevant group is central to the individual’s self-identity, threats of the group are likely to increase radicalisation tendencies.

3. How western foreign policies in the Middle East and the poor integration of Muslims in European societies are experienced.

4. Network dynamics (especially group dynamics).

5. Processes of radicalisation are individual and may evolve in many different directions, including non-violent ones.

6. People differ in the extent to which they are susceptible to or appealed by radical ideologies – only a few of those exposed to radical ideologies become radicalised.

7. The concept of cognitive dissonance – the psychological phenomenon which occurs when a person’s behaviour is in sharp conflict with that person’s attitudes and beliefs, which leads to psychological discomfort and further leads that person to invest more in believing what he or she is saying – may hold insights which could be valuable to describe the process whereby a person becomes more and more radicalised.

DIIS then looked at the counter-radicalisation strategies of the European Union (EU), the Netherlands and the UK.

Looking closely at the EU policies designed to curb radicalisation, the institute said the European Commission focuses strongly on causal factors on the external level that might contribute to radicalisation. Less attention is paid to setting out measures that address causal factors at the social level, and almost no mention is made of tackling causes of radicalisation at the individual level in EU policy papers.

DIIS said, “We argue that the causes for radicalisation that can be found in the direct environment of the individual deserve further notice when shaping EU policies.”

Furthermore, it said, the EU strategy for countering radicalisation should be considered as part of its overall counterterrorism strategy.

“However, after assessing the EU measures, it is clear that the Union’s efforts are aimed more at addressing external factors of radicalisation rather than dealing with the individual causes that lead people to feel attracted to radical ideologies in the first place,” the institute said. “For instance, although disrupting radical networks is important in preventing the emergence of new recruits to terrorism, without addressing the direct causes for radicalisation new networks will continue to form. We argue that such causes can be found in social environments and individual dynamics.”

Given the multilateral character of the European Union and the fact that the responsibility for countering radicalisation lies with the individual EU members, a lack of instruments might prevent the EU from effectively addressing social and individual factors that cause radicalisation, DIIS said.

“Despite difficulties in coordination, the EU strategies nonetheless provide a valuable framework that individual member states can use in shaping counter-radicalisation policies at the national level,” the Danish Institute for International Studies said.

It noted that preventing radicalisation is one of the four objectives in the British Home Office Strategy.

This involves a number of steps and specific measures, including challenging the ideology of violent extremism, addressing radicalisation in prisons, working with education institutions, and tackling the use of the internet to radicalise and groom young people.

“The UK strives to persuade young Muslims that they can be Muslim and British, and that Islam is not regarded with hostility,” DIIS said.

Encouragement of moderate Muslim opinion is of top priority for the UK, reflecting the considerations that 1) the developments within Islam are believed to contribute to radical Islamism and 2) that radicalisation of Muslims is partly the result of conflicts between moderate and radical movements within Islam.

In the UK, countering radicalisation has first and foremost been undertaken at the external and social levels, DIIS said.

“Tackling not only the types of causes, but also the catalysts of recruitment and trigger events, the UK authorities are laying the foundation for effectively dealing with the threat of radicalisation for youngsters,” the institute said in the report. “Encouraging positive network dynamics by promoting dialogue and moderate Muslim opinion, the UK places great importance on understanding the perceptions of Muslim communities and the changes within them. On the other hand, the UK has downplayed the importance of causes at the individual level.”

Through its Wij Amsterdammers approach, the Netherlands has developed a three-string strategy to counter radicalisation, DIIS noted.

1. A hard and repressive approach is employed against ‘doers’, that is, extremists suspected of being willing to use violence in trying to achieve their ideological goals.

2. A soft power approach aimed at the ‘thinkers’, that is, individuals that do not want to employ violent tactics (yet), but do radicalise in the sense that they are increasingly following radical ideologies.

3. A preventive approach intended to eliminate the breeding grounds for radicalisation. This includes measures aimed at increasing resistance against radical thoughts among individuals that might be sensitive to these ideas.

“As is the case with the UK, however, the broad and often general policies fail to take into account the possible causes of radicalisation at the individual level, namely the psychological characteristics and personal experiences, which, according to this deliverable, is one of the so far downplayed approaches to tackle radicalisation,” DIIS said. “While it is the aim of the Amsterdam approach to eliminate breeding grounds for radicalisation, the measures continue to emphasize the external and social level as the main areas in which progress can be achieved.”

The report is part of DIIS’s participation in the European research network Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (TTSRL), which is funded by the EU Commission.